An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game
Rosemarie Nagel, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Nicolaas J. Vriend, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1999, Vol. 9, Issue 1, p. 27-65
[Also appeared in: U. Cantner, H. Hanusch, & S. Klepper (Eds.), Economic Evolution, Learning, and Complexity, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2000, p. 33-71]

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Abstract. We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

J.E.L. classification codes. C72, C91, D83

Keywords. Market Game, Oligopoly, Adaptive Behavior, Learning

Nick Vriend,
Last modified 2016-02-05